external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/Bv9ARM.ch04.html
author snj <snj@NetBSD.org>
Fri, 21 Apr 2017 05:23:16 +0000
branchnetbsd-7
changeset 255169 100f91761a81
parent 255108 02707a5b4f91
child 255204 5191ea96bd7d
permissions -rw-r--r--
Pull up following revision(s) (requested by spz in ticket #1404): doc/3RDPARTY: 1.1430 via patch external/bsd/bind/dist/CHANGES: up to 1.26 external/bsd/bind/dist/COPYRIGHT: up to 1.1.1.11 external/bsd/bind/dist/README: up to 1.14 external/bsd/bind/dist/bin/named/query.c: up to 1.24 external/bsd/bind/dist/bin/tests/system/dname/ans3/ans.pl: up to 1.1.1.2 external/bsd/bind/dist/bin/tests/system/dname/ns1/root.db: up to 1.1.1.4 external/bsd/bind/dist/bin/tests/system/dname/ns2/example.db: up to 1.1.1.4 external/bsd/bind/dist/bin/tests/system/dname/tests.sh: up to 1.1.1.6 external/bsd/bind/dist/bin/tests/system/rndc/tests.sh: up to 1.1.1.9 external/bsd/bind/dist/bin/tests/system/rpz/tests.sh: up to 1.1.1.13 external/bsd/bind/dist/bind.keys: up to 1.1.1.6 external/bsd/bind/dist/bind.keys.h: up to 1.1.1.4 external/bsd/bind/dist/configure: up to 1.7 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/Bv9ARM.ch01.html: up to 1.1.1.24 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/Bv9ARM.ch02.html: up to 1.1.1.21 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/Bv9ARM.ch03.html: up to 1.1.1.26 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/Bv9ARM.ch04.html: up to 1.14 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/Bv9ARM.ch05.html: up to 1.1.1.27 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/Bv9ARM.ch06.html: up to 1.14 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/Bv9ARM.ch07.html: up to 1.14 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/Bv9ARM.ch08.html: up to 1.14 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/Bv9ARM.ch09.html: up to 1.14 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/Bv9ARM.ch10.html: up to 1.1.1.23 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/Bv9ARM.ch11.html: up to 1.1.1.12 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/Bv9ARM.ch12.html: up to 1.1.1.12 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/Bv9ARM.ch13.html: up to 1.1.1.12 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/Bv9ARM.html: up to 1.14 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/Bv9ARM.pdf: up to 1.19 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/man.arpaname.html: up to 1.14 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/man.ddns-confgen.html: up to 1.14 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/man.delv.html: up to 1.14 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/man.dig.html: up to 1.14 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/man.dnssec-checkds.html: up to 1.14 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/man.dnssec-coverage.html: up to 1.14 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/man.dnssec-dsfromkey.html: up to 1.14 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/man.dnssec-importkey.html: up to 1.14 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/man.dnssec-keyfromlabel.html: up to 1.14 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/man.dnssec-keygen.html: up to 1.14 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/man.dnssec-revoke.html: up to 1.14 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/man.dnssec-settime.html: up to 1.14 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/man.dnssec-signzone.html: up to 1.14 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/man.dnssec-verify.html: up to 1.14 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/man.genrandom.html: up to 1.14 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/man.host.html: up to 1.14 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/man.isc-hmac-fixup.html: up to 1.14 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/man.lwresd.html: up to 1.1.1.6 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/man.named-checkconf.html: up to 1.14 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/man.named-checkzone.html: up to 1.14 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/man.named-journalprint.html: up to 1.14 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/man.named-rrchecker.html: up to 1.14 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/man.named.conf.html: up to 1.1.1.6 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/man.named.html: up to 1.14 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/man.nsec3hash.html: up to 1.14 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/man.nsupdate.html: up to 1.14 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/man.rndc-confgen.html: up to 1.14 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/man.rndc.conf.html: up to 1.14 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/man.rndc.html: up to 1.14 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/notes.html: up to 1.1.1.12 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/notes.pdf: up to 1.1.1.12 external/bsd/bind/dist/doc/arm/notes.xml: up to 1.1.1.12 external/bsd/bind/dist/lib/dns/api: up to 1.14 external/bsd/bind/dist/lib/dns/rdataset.c: up to 1.10 external/bsd/bind/dist/lib/dns/resolver.c: up to 1.30 external/bsd/bind/dist/lib/isc/include/isc/lex.h: up to 1.5 external/bsd/bind/dist/lib/isc/lex.c: up to 1.8 external/bsd/bind/dist/srcid: up to 1.20 external/bsd/bind/dist/version: up to 1.24 Update BIND to 9.10.4-P8.

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<div class="chapter">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h1 class="title">
<a name="Bv9ARM.ch04"></a>Chapter 4. Advanced DNS Features</h1></div></div></div>
<div class="toc">
<p><b>Table of Contents</b></p>
<dl class="toc">
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#notify">Notify</a></span></dt>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#dynamic_update">Dynamic Update</a></span></dt>
<dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#journal">The journal file</a></span></dt></dl></dd>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#incremental_zone_transfers">Incremental Zone Transfers (IXFR)</a></span></dt>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#split_dns">Split DNS</a></span></dt>
<dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#split_dns_sample">Example split DNS setup</a></span></dt></dl></dd>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#tsig">TSIG</a></span></dt>
<dd><dl>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id-1.5.6.5">Generating a Shared Key</a></span></dt>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id-1.5.6.6">Loading A New Key</a></span></dt>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id-1.5.6.7">Instructing the Server to Use a Key</a></span></dt>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id-1.5.6.8">TSIG-Based Access Control</a></span></dt>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id-1.5.6.9">Errors</a></span></dt>
</dl></dd>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#tkey">TKEY</a></span></dt>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#sig0">SIG(0)</a></span></dt>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#DNSSEC">DNSSEC</a></span></dt>
<dd><dl>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#dnssec_keys">Generating Keys</a></span></dt>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#dnssec_signing">Signing the Zone</a></span></dt>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#dnssec_config">Configuring Servers</a></span></dt>
</dl></dd>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#dnssec.dynamic.zones">DNSSEC, Dynamic Zones, and Automatic Signing</a></span></dt>
<dd><dl>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id-1.5.10.3">Converting from insecure to secure</a></span></dt>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id-1.5.10.8">Dynamic DNS update method</a></span></dt>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id-1.5.10.16">Fully automatic zone signing</a></span></dt>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id-1.5.10.25">Private-type records</a></span></dt>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id-1.5.10.32">DNSKEY rollovers</a></span></dt>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id-1.5.10.34">Dynamic DNS update method</a></span></dt>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id-1.5.10.39">Automatic key rollovers</a></span></dt>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id-1.5.10.41">NSEC3PARAM rollovers via UPDATE</a></span></dt>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id-1.5.10.43">Converting from NSEC to NSEC3</a></span></dt>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id-1.5.10.45">Converting from NSEC3 to NSEC</a></span></dt>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id-1.5.10.47">Converting from secure to insecure</a></span></dt>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id-1.5.10.51">Periodic re-signing</a></span></dt>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id-1.5.10.53">NSEC3 and OPTOUT</a></span></dt>
</dl></dd>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#rfc5011.support">Dynamic Trust Anchor Management</a></span></dt>
<dd><dl>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id-1.5.11.3">Validating Resolver</a></span></dt>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id-1.5.11.4">Authoritative Server</a></span></dt>
</dl></dd>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#pkcs11">PKCS#11 (Cryptoki) support</a></span></dt>
<dd><dl>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id-1.5.12.6">Prerequisites</a></span></dt>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id-1.5.12.7">Native PKCS#11</a></span></dt>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id-1.5.12.8">OpenSSL-based PKCS#11</a></span></dt>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id-1.5.12.9">PKCS#11 Tools</a></span></dt>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id-1.5.12.10">Using the HSM</a></span></dt>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id-1.5.12.11">Specifying the engine on the command line</a></span></dt>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id-1.5.12.12">Running named with automatic zone re-signing</a></span></dt>
</dl></dd>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#dlz-info">DLZ (Dynamically Loadable Zones)</a></span></dt>
<dd><dl>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id-1.5.13.6">Configuring DLZ</a></span></dt>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id-1.5.13.7">Sample DLZ Driver</a></span></dt>
</dl></dd>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#ipv6">IPv6 Support in <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 9</a></span></dt>
<dd><dl>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id-1.5.14.6">Address Lookups Using AAAA Records</a></span></dt>
<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id-1.5.14.7">Address to Name Lookups Using Nibble Format</a></span></dt>
</dl></dd>
</dl>
</div>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both">
<a name="notify"></a>Notify</h2></div></div></div>
<p>
        <acronym class="acronym">DNS</acronym> NOTIFY is a mechanism that allows master
        servers to notify their slave servers of changes to a zone's data. In
        response to a <span class="command"><strong>NOTIFY</strong></span> from a master server, the
        slave will check to see that its version of the zone is the
        current version and, if not, initiate a zone transfer.
      </p>
<p>
        For more information about <acronym class="acronym">DNS</acronym>
        <span class="command"><strong>NOTIFY</strong></span>, see the description of the
        <span class="command"><strong>notify</strong></span> option in <a class="xref" href="Bv9ARM.ch06.html#boolean_options" title="Boolean Options">the section called &#8220;Boolean Options&#8221;</a> and
        the description of the zone option <span class="command"><strong>also-notify</strong></span> in
        <a class="xref" href="Bv9ARM.ch06.html#zone_transfers" title="Zone Transfers">the section called &#8220;Zone Transfers&#8221;</a>.  The <span class="command"><strong>NOTIFY</strong></span>
        protocol is specified in RFC 1996.
      </p>
<div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;">
<h3 class="title">Note</h3>
<p>
        As a slave zone can also be a master to other slaves, <span class="command"><strong>named</strong></span>,
        by default, sends <span class="command"><strong>NOTIFY</strong></span> messages for every zone
        it loads.  Specifying <span class="command"><strong>notify master-only;</strong></span> will
        cause <span class="command"><strong>named</strong></span> to only send <span class="command"><strong>NOTIFY</strong></span> for master
        zones that it loads.
      </p>
</div>
</div>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both">
<a name="dynamic_update"></a>Dynamic Update</h2></div></div></div>
<p>
        Dynamic Update is a method for adding, replacing or deleting
        records in a master server by sending it a special form of DNS
        messages.  The format and meaning of these messages is specified
        in RFC 2136.
      </p>
<p>
        Dynamic update is enabled by including an
        <span class="command"><strong>allow-update</strong></span> or an <span class="command"><strong>update-policy</strong></span>
        clause in the <span class="command"><strong>zone</strong></span> statement.
      </p>
<p>
        If the zone's <span class="command"><strong>update-policy</strong></span> is set to
        <strong class="userinput"><code>local</code></strong>, updates to the zone
        will be permitted for the key <code class="varname">local-ddns</code>,
        which will be generated by <span class="command"><strong>named</strong></span> at startup.
        See <a class="xref" href="Bv9ARM.ch06.html#dynamic_update_policies" title="Dynamic Update Policies">the section called &#8220;Dynamic Update Policies&#8221;</a> for more details.
      </p>
<p>
        Dynamic updates using Kerberos signed requests can be made
        using the TKEY/GSS protocol by setting either the
        <span class="command"><strong>tkey-gssapi-keytab</strong></span> option, or alternatively
        by setting both the <span class="command"><strong>tkey-gssapi-credential</strong></span>
        and <span class="command"><strong>tkey-domain</strong></span> options. Once enabled,
        Kerberos signed requests will be matched against the update
        policies for the zone, using the Kerberos principal as the
        signer for the request.
      </p>
<p>
        Updating of secure zones (zones using DNSSEC) follows RFC
        3007: RRSIG, NSEC and NSEC3 records affected by updates are
        automatically regenerated by the server using an online
        zone key.  Update authorization is based on transaction
        signatures and an explicit server policy.
      </p>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="journal"></a>The journal file</h3></div></div></div>
<p>
          All changes made to a zone using dynamic update are stored
          in the zone's journal file.  This file is automatically created
          by the server when the first dynamic update takes place.
          The name of the journal file is formed by appending the extension
          <code class="filename">.jnl</code> to the name of the
          corresponding zone
          file unless specifically overridden.  The journal file is in a
          binary format and should not be edited manually.
        </p>
<p>
          The server will also occasionally write ("dump")
          the complete contents of the updated zone to its zone file.
          This is not done immediately after
          each dynamic update, because that would be too slow when a large
          zone is updated frequently.  Instead, the dump is delayed by
          up to 15 minutes, allowing additional updates to take place.
          During the dump process, transient files will be created
          with the extensions <code class="filename">.jnw</code> and
          <code class="filename">.jbk</code>; under ordinary circumstances, these
          will be removed when the dump is complete, and can be safely
          ignored.
        </p>
<p>
          When a server is restarted after a shutdown or crash, it will replay
              the journal file to incorporate into the zone any updates that
          took
          place after the last zone dump.
        </p>
<p>
          Changes that result from incoming incremental zone transfers are
          also
          journalled in a similar way.
        </p>
<p>
          The zone files of dynamic zones cannot normally be edited by
          hand because they are not guaranteed to contain the most recent
          dynamic changes &#8212; those are only in the journal file.
          The only way to ensure that the zone file of a dynamic zone
          is up to date is to run <span class="command"><strong>rndc stop</strong></span>.
        </p>
<p>
          If you have to make changes to a dynamic zone
          manually, the following procedure will work:
          Disable dynamic updates to the zone using
          <span class="command"><strong>rndc freeze <em class="replaceable"><code>zone</code></em></strong></span>.
          This will update the zone's master file with the changes
          stored in its <code class="filename">.jnl</code> file.
          Edit the zone file.  Run
          <span class="command"><strong>rndc thaw <em class="replaceable"><code>zone</code></em></strong></span>
          to reload the changed zone and re-enable dynamic updates.
        </p>
<p>
          <span class="command"><strong>rndc sync <em class="replaceable"><code>zone</code></em></strong></span>
          will update the zone file with changes from the journal file
          without stopping dynamic updates; this may be useful for viewing
          the current zone state.  To remove the <code class="filename">.jnl</code>
          file after updating the zone file, use
          <span class="command"><strong>rndc sync -clean</strong></span>.
        </p>
</div>
</div>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both">
<a name="incremental_zone_transfers"></a>Incremental Zone Transfers (IXFR)</h2></div></div></div>
<p>
        The incremental zone transfer (IXFR) protocol is a way for
        slave servers to transfer only changed data, instead of having to
        transfer the entire zone. The IXFR protocol is specified in RFC
        1995. See <a class="xref" href="Bv9ARM.ch11.html#proposed_standards" title="Proposed Standards">Proposed Standards</a>.
      </p>
<p>
        When acting as a master, <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 9
        supports IXFR for those zones
        where the necessary change history information is available. These
        include master zones maintained by dynamic update and slave zones
        whose data was obtained by IXFR.  For manually maintained master
        zones, and for slave zones obtained by performing a full zone
        transfer (AXFR), IXFR is supported only if the option
        <span class="command"><strong>ixfr-from-differences</strong></span> is set
        to <strong class="userinput"><code>yes</code></strong>.
      </p>
<p>
        When acting as a slave, <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 9 will
        attempt to use IXFR unless
        it is explicitly disabled. For more information about disabling
        IXFR, see the description of the <span class="command"><strong>request-ixfr</strong></span> clause
        of the <span class="command"><strong>server</strong></span> statement.
      </p>
</div>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both">
<a name="split_dns"></a>Split DNS</h2></div></div></div>
<p>
        Setting up different views, or visibility, of the DNS space to
        internal and external resolvers is usually referred to as a
        <span class="emphasis"><em>Split DNS</em></span> setup. There are several
        reasons an organization would want to set up its DNS this way.
      </p>
<p>
        One common reason for setting up a DNS system this way is
        to hide "internal" DNS information from "external" clients on the
        Internet. There is some debate as to whether or not this is actually
        useful.
        Internal DNS information leaks out in many ways (via email headers,
        for example) and most savvy "attackers" can find the information
        they need using other means.
        However, since listing addresses of internal servers that
        external clients cannot possibly reach can result in
        connection delays and other annoyances, an organization may
        choose to use a Split DNS to present a consistent view of itself
        to the outside world.
      </p>
<p>
        Another common reason for setting up a Split DNS system is
        to allow internal networks that are behind filters or in RFC 1918
        space (reserved IP space, as documented in RFC 1918) to resolve DNS
        on the Internet. Split DNS can also be used to allow mail from outside
        back in to the internal network.
      </p>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="split_dns_sample"></a>Example split DNS setup</h3></div></div></div>
<p>
          Let's say a company named <span class="emphasis"><em>Example, Inc.</em></span>
          (<code class="literal">example.com</code>)
          has several corporate sites that have an internal network with
          reserved
          Internet Protocol (IP) space and an external demilitarized zone (DMZ),
          or "outside" section of a network, that is available to the public.
        </p>
<p>
          <span class="emphasis"><em>Example, Inc.</em></span> wants its internal clients
          to be able to resolve external hostnames and to exchange mail with
          people on the outside. The company also wants its internal resolvers
          to have access to certain internal-only zones that are not available
          at all outside of the internal network.
        </p>
<p>
          In order to accomplish this, the company will set up two sets
          of name servers. One set will be on the inside network (in the
          reserved
          IP space) and the other set will be on bastion hosts, which are
          "proxy"
          hosts that can talk to both sides of its network, in the DMZ.
        </p>
<p>
          The internal servers will be configured to forward all queries,
          except queries for <code class="filename">site1.internal</code>, <code class="filename">site2.internal</code>, <code class="filename">site1.example.com</code>,
          and <code class="filename">site2.example.com</code>, to the servers
          in the
          DMZ. These internal servers will have complete sets of information
          for <code class="filename">site1.example.com</code>, <code class="filename">site2.example.com</code>, <code class="filename">site1.internal</code>,
          and <code class="filename">site2.internal</code>.
        </p>
<p>
          To protect the <code class="filename">site1.internal</code> and <code class="filename">site2.internal</code> domains,
          the internal name servers must be configured to disallow all queries
          to these domains from any external hosts, including the bastion
          hosts.
        </p>
<p>
          The external servers, which are on the bastion hosts, will
          be configured to serve the "public" version of the <code class="filename">site1</code> and <code class="filename">site2.example.com</code> zones.
          This could include things such as the host records for public servers
          (<code class="filename">www.example.com</code> and <code class="filename">ftp.example.com</code>),
          and mail exchange (MX)  records (<code class="filename">a.mx.example.com</code> and <code class="filename">b.mx.example.com</code>).
        </p>
<p>
          In addition, the public <code class="filename">site1</code> and <code class="filename">site2.example.com</code> zones
          should have special MX records that contain wildcard (`*') records
          pointing to the bastion hosts. This is needed because external mail
          servers do not have any other way of looking up how to deliver mail
          to those internal hosts. With the wildcard records, the mail will
          be delivered to the bastion host, which can then forward it on to
          internal hosts.
        </p>
<p>
          Here's an example of a wildcard MX record:
        </p>
<pre class="programlisting">*   IN MX 10 external1.example.com.</pre>
<p>
          Now that they accept mail on behalf of anything in the internal
          network, the bastion hosts will need to know how to deliver mail
          to internal hosts. In order for this to work properly, the resolvers
          on
          the bastion hosts will need to be configured to point to the internal
          name servers for DNS resolution.
        </p>
<p>
          Queries for internal hostnames will be answered by the internal
          servers, and queries for external hostnames will be forwarded back
          out to the DNS servers on the bastion hosts.
        </p>
<p>
          In order for all this to work properly, internal clients will
          need to be configured to query <span class="emphasis"><em>only</em></span> the internal
          name servers for DNS queries. This could also be enforced via
          selective
          filtering on the network.
        </p>
<p>
          If everything has been set properly, <span class="emphasis"><em>Example, Inc.</em></span>'s
          internal clients will now be able to:
        </p>
<div class="itemizedlist"><ul class="itemizedlist" style="list-style-type: disc; ">
<li class="listitem">
              Look up any hostnames in the <code class="literal">site1</code>
              and
              <code class="literal">site2.example.com</code> zones.
            </li>
<li class="listitem">
              Look up any hostnames in the <code class="literal">site1.internal</code> and
              <code class="literal">site2.internal</code> domains.
            </li>
<li class="listitem">Look up any hostnames on the Internet.</li>
<li class="listitem">Exchange mail with both internal and external people.</li>
</ul></div>
<p>
          Hosts on the Internet will be able to:
        </p>
<div class="itemizedlist"><ul class="itemizedlist" style="list-style-type: disc; ">
<li class="listitem">
              Look up any hostnames in the <code class="literal">site1</code>
              and
              <code class="literal">site2.example.com</code> zones.
            </li>
<li class="listitem">
              Exchange mail with anyone in the <code class="literal">site1</code> and
              <code class="literal">site2.example.com</code> zones.
            </li>
</ul></div>
<p>
          Here is an example configuration for the setup we just
          described above. Note that this is only configuration information;
          for information on how to configure your zone files, see <a class="xref" href="Bv9ARM.ch03.html#sample_configuration" title="Sample Configurations">the section called &#8220;Sample Configurations&#8221;</a>.
        </p>
<p>
          Internal DNS server config:
        </p>
<pre class="programlisting">

acl internals { 172.16.72.0/24; 192.168.1.0/24; };

acl externals { <code class="varname">bastion-ips-go-here</code>; };

options {
    ...
    ...
    forward only;
    // forward to external servers
    forwarders {
        <code class="varname">bastion-ips-go-here</code>;
    };
    // sample allow-transfer (no one)
    allow-transfer { none; };
    // restrict query access
    allow-query { internals; externals; };
    // restrict recursion
    allow-recursion { internals; };
    ...
    ...
};

// sample master zone
zone "site1.example.com" {
  type master;
  file "m/site1.example.com";
  // do normal iterative resolution (do not forward)
  forwarders { };
  allow-query { internals; externals; };
  allow-transfer { internals; };
};

// sample slave zone
zone "site2.example.com" {
  type slave;
  file "s/site2.example.com";
  masters { 172.16.72.3; };
  forwarders { };
  allow-query { internals; externals; };
  allow-transfer { internals; };
};

zone "site1.internal" {
  type master;
  file "m/site1.internal";
  forwarders { };
  allow-query { internals; };
  allow-transfer { internals; }
};

zone "site2.internal" {
  type slave;
  file "s/site2.internal";
  masters { 172.16.72.3; };
  forwarders { };
  allow-query { internals };
  allow-transfer { internals; }
};
</pre>
<p>
          External (bastion host) DNS server config:
        </p>
<pre class="programlisting">
acl internals { 172.16.72.0/24; 192.168.1.0/24; };

acl externals { bastion-ips-go-here; };

options {
  ...
  ...
  // sample allow-transfer (no one)
  allow-transfer { none; };
  // default query access
  allow-query { any; };
  // restrict cache access
  allow-query-cache { internals; externals; };
  // restrict recursion
  allow-recursion { internals; externals; };
  ...
  ...
};

// sample slave zone
zone "site1.example.com" {
  type master;
  file "m/site1.foo.com";
  allow-transfer { internals; externals; };
};

zone "site2.example.com" {
  type slave;
  file "s/site2.foo.com";
  masters { another_bastion_host_maybe; };
  allow-transfer { internals; externals; }
};
</pre>
<p>
          In the <code class="filename">resolv.conf</code> (or equivalent) on
          the bastion host(s):
        </p>
<pre class="programlisting">
search ...
nameserver 172.16.72.2
nameserver 172.16.72.3
nameserver 172.16.72.4
</pre>
</div>
</div>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both">
<a name="tsig"></a>TSIG</h2></div></div></div>
<p>
        TSIG (Transaction SIGnatures) is a mechanism for authenticating DNS
        messages, originally specified in RFC 2845. It allows DNS messages
        to be cryptographically signed using a shared secret.  TSIG can
        be used in any DNS transaction, as a way to restrict access to
        certain server functions (e.g., recursive queries) to authorized
        clients when IP-based access control is insufficient or needs to
        be overridden, or as a way to ensure message authenticity when it
        is critical to the integrity of the server, such as with dynamic
        UPDATE messages or zone transfers from a master to a slave server.
      </p>
<p>
        This is a guide to setting up TSIG in <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym>.
        It describes the configuration syntax and the process of creating
        TSIG keys.
      </p>
<p>
        <span class="command"><strong>named</strong></span> supports TSIG for server-to-server
        communication, and some of the tools included with
        <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> support it for sending messages to
        <span class="command"><strong>named</strong></span>:
        </p>
<div class="itemizedlist"><ul class="itemizedlist" style="list-style-type: disc; ">
<li class="listitem">
<a class="xref" href="man.nsupdate.html" title="nsupdate"><span class="refentrytitle"><span class="application">nsupdate</span></span>(1)</a> supports TSIG via the
            <code class="option">-k</code>, <code class="option">-l</code> and
            <code class="option">-y</code> command line options, or via
            the <span class="command"><strong>key</strong></span> command when running
            interactively.
          </li>
<li class="listitem">
<a class="xref" href="man.dig.html" title="dig"><span class="refentrytitle">dig</span>(1)</a> supports TSIG via the
            <code class="option">-k</code> and <code class="option">-y</code> command
            line options.
          </li>
</ul></div>
<p>
      </p>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.6.5"></a>Generating a Shared Key</h3></div></div></div>
<p>
          TSIG keys can be generated using the <span class="command"><strong>tsig-keygen</strong></span>
          command; the output of the command is a <span class="command"><strong>key</strong></span> directive
          suitable for inclusion in <code class="filename">named.conf</code>.  The
          key name, algorithm and size can be specified by command line parameters;
          the defaults are "tsig-key", HMAC-SHA256, and 256 bits, respectively.
        </p>
<p>
          Any string which is a valid DNS name can be used as a key name.
          For example, a key to be shared between servers called
          <span class="emphasis"><em>host1</em></span> and <span class="emphasis"><em>host2</em></span> could
          be called "host1-host2.", and this key could be generated using:
        </p>
<pre class="programlisting">
  $ tsig-keygen host1-host2. &gt; host1-host2.key
</pre>
<p>
          This key may then be copied to both hosts.  The key name and secret
          must be identical on both hosts.
          (Note: copying a shared secret from one server to another is beyond
          the scope of the DNS. A secure transport mechanism should be used:
          secure FTP, SSL, ssh, telephone, encrypted email, etc.)
        </p>
<p>
          <span class="command"><strong>tsig-keygen</strong></span> can also be run as
          <span class="command"><strong>ddns-confgen</strong></span>, in which case its output includes
          additional configuration text for setting up dynamic DNS in
          <span class="command"><strong>named</strong></span>.  See <a class="xref" href="man.ddns-confgen.html" title="ddns-confgen"><span class="refentrytitle"><span class="application">ddns-confgen</span></span>(8)</a>
          for details.
        </p>
</div>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.6.6"></a>Loading A New Key</h3></div></div></div>
<p>
          For a key shared between servers called
          <span class="emphasis"><em>host1</em></span> and <span class="emphasis"><em>host2</em></span>,
          the following could be added to each server's
          <code class="filename">named.conf</code> file:
        </p>
<pre class="programlisting">
key "host1-host2." {
        algorithm hmac-sha256;
        secret "DAopyf1mhCbFVZw7pgmNPBoLUq8wEUT7UuPoLENP2HY=";
};
</pre>
<p>
          (This is the same key generated above using
          <span class="command"><strong>tsig-keygen</strong></span>.)
        </p>
<p>
          Since this text contains a secret, it
          is recommended that either <code class="filename">named.conf</code> not be
          world-readable, or that the <span class="command"><strong>key</strong></span> directive
          be stored in a file which is not world-readable, and which is
          included in <code class="filename">named.conf</code> via the
          <span class="command"><strong>include</strong></span> directive.
        </p>
<p>
          Once a key has been added to <code class="filename">named.conf</code> and the
          server has been restarted or reconfigured, the server can recognize
          the key.  If the server receives a message signed by the
          key, it will be able to verify the signature.  If the signature
          is valid, the response will be signed using the same key.
        </p>
<p>
          TSIG keys that are known to a server can be listed using the
          command <span class="command"><strong>rndc tsig-list</strong></span>.
        </p>
</div>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.6.7"></a>Instructing the Server to Use a Key</h3></div></div></div>
<p>
          A server sending a request to another server must be told whether
          to use a key, and if so, which key to use.
        </p>
<p>
          For example, a key may be specified for each server in the
          <span class="command"><strong>masters</strong></span> statement in the definition of a
          slave zone; in this case, all SOA QUERY messages, NOTIFY
          messages, and zone transfer requests (AXFR or IXFR) will be
          signed using the specified key.  Keys may also be specified
          in the <span class="command"><strong>also-notify</strong></span> statement of a master
          or slave zone, causing NOTIFY messages to be signed using
          the specified key.
        </p>
<p>
          Keys can also be specified in a <span class="command"><strong>server</strong></span>
          directive. Adding the following on <span class="emphasis"><em>host1</em></span>,
          if the IP address of <span class="emphasis"><em>host2</em></span> is 10.1.2.3, would
          cause <span class="emphasis"><em>all</em></span> requests from <span class="emphasis"><em>host1</em></span>
          to <span class="emphasis"><em>host2</em></span>, including normal DNS queries, to be
          signed using the <span class="command"><strong>host1-host2.</strong></span> key:
        </p>
<pre class="programlisting">
server 10.1.2.3 {
        keys { host1-host2. ;};
};
</pre>
<p>
          Multiple keys may be present in the <span class="command"><strong>keys</strong></span>
          statement, but only the first one is used.  As this directive does
          not contain secrets, it can be used in a world-readable file.
        </p>
<p>
          Requests sent by <span class="emphasis"><em>host2</em></span> to <span class="emphasis"><em>host1</em></span>
          would <span class="emphasis"><em>not</em></span> be signed, unless a similar
          <span class="command"><strong>server</strong></span> directive were in <span class="emphasis"><em>host2</em></span>'s
          configuration file.
        </p>
<p>
          Whenever any server sends a TSIG-signed DNS request, it will expect
          the response to be signed with the same key. If a response is not
          signed, or if the signature is not valid, the response will be
          rejected.
        </p>
</div>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.6.8"></a>TSIG-Based Access Control</h3></div></div></div>
<p>
          TSIG keys may be specified in ACL definitions and ACL directives
          such as <span class="command"><strong>allow-query</strong></span>, <span class="command"><strong>allow-transfer</strong></span>
          and <span class="command"><strong>allow-update</strong></span>.
          The above key would be denoted in an ACL element as
          <span class="command"><strong>key host1-host2.</strong></span>
        </p>
<p>
          An example of an <span class="command"><strong>allow-update</strong></span> directive using
          a TSIG key:
        </p>
<pre class="programlisting">
allow-update { !{ !localnets; any; }; key host1-host2. ;};
</pre>
<p>
          This allows dynamic updates to succeed only if the UPDATE
          request comes from an address in <span class="command"><strong>localnets</strong></span>,
          <span class="emphasis"><em>and</em></span> if it is signed using the
          <span class="command"><strong>host1-host2.</strong></span> key.
        </p>
<p>
          See <a class="xref" href="Bv9ARM.ch06.html#dynamic_update_policies" title="Dynamic Update Policies">the section called &#8220;Dynamic Update Policies&#8221;</a> for a discussion of
          the more flexible <span class="command"><strong>update-policy</strong></span> statement.
        </p>
</div>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.6.9"></a>Errors</h3></div></div></div>
<p>
          Processing of TSIG-signed messages can result in several errors:
          </p>
<div class="itemizedlist"><ul class="itemizedlist" style="list-style-type: disc; ">
<li class="listitem">
              If a TSIG-aware server receives a message signed by an
              unknown key, the response will be unsigned, with the TSIG
              extended error code set to BADKEY.
            </li>
<li class="listitem">
              If a TSIG-aware server receives a message from a known key
              but with an invalid signature, the response will be unsigned,
              with the TSIG extended error code set to BADSIG.
            </li>
<li class="listitem">
              If a TSIG-aware server receives a message with a time
              outside of the allowed range, the response will be signed, with
              the TSIG extended error code set to BADTIME, and the time values
              will be adjusted so that the response can be successfully
              verified.
            </li>
</ul></div>
<p>
          In all of the above cases, the server will return a response code
          of NOTAUTH (not authenticated).
        </p>
</div>
</div>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both">
<a name="tkey"></a>TKEY</h2></div></div></div>
<p>
        TKEY (Transaction KEY) is a mechanism for automatically negotiating
        a shared secret between two hosts, originally specified in RFC 2930.
      </p>
<p>
        There are several TKEY "modes" that specify how a key is to be
        generated or assigned.  <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 9 implements only
        one of these modes: Diffie-Hellman key exchange.  Both hosts are
        required to have a KEY record with algorithm DH (though this
        record is not required to be present in a zone).
      </p>
<p>
        The TKEY process is initiated by a client or server by sending
        a query of type TKEY to a TKEY-aware server.  The query must include
        an appropriate KEY record in the additional section, and
        must be signed using either TSIG or SIG(0) with a previously
        established key.  The server's response, if successful, will
        contain a TKEY record in its answer section.  After this transaction,
        both participants will have enough information to calculate a
        shared secret using Diffie-Hellman key exchange.  The shared secret
        can then be used by to sign subsequent transactions between the
        two servers.
      </p>
<p>
        TSIG keys known by the server, including TKEY-negotiated keys, can
        be listed using <span class="command"><strong>rndc tsig-list</strong></span>.
      </p>
<p>
        TKEY-negotiated keys can be deleted from a server using
        <span class="command"><strong>rndc tsig-delete</strong></span>.  This can also be done via
        the TKEY protocol itself, by sending an authenticated TKEY query
        specifying the "key deletion" mode.
      </p>
</div>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both">
<a name="sig0"></a>SIG(0)</h2></div></div></div>
<p>
        <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> partially supports DNSSEC SIG(0)
        transaction signatures as specified in RFC 2535 and RFC 2931.
        SIG(0) uses public/private keys to authenticate messages.  Access control
        is performed in the same manner as TSIG keys; privileges can be
        granted or denied in ACL directives based on the key name.
      </p>
<p>
        When a SIG(0) signed message is received, it will only be
        verified if the key is known and trusted by the server. The
        server will not attempt to recursively fetch or validate the
        key.
      </p>
<p>
        SIG(0) signing of multiple-message TCP streams is not supported.
      </p>
<p>
        The only tool shipped with <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 9 that
        generates SIG(0) signed messages is <span class="command"><strong>nsupdate</strong></span>.
      </p>
</div>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both">
<a name="DNSSEC"></a>DNSSEC</h2></div></div></div>
<p>
        Cryptographic authentication of DNS information is possible
        through the DNS Security (<span class="emphasis"><em>DNSSEC-bis</em></span>) extensions,
        defined in RFC 4033, RFC 4034, and RFC 4035.
        This section describes the creation and use of DNSSEC signed zones.
      </p>
<p>
        In order to set up a DNSSEC secure zone, there are a series
        of steps which must be followed.  <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym>
        9 ships
        with several tools
        that are used in this process, which are explained in more detail
        below.  In all cases, the <code class="option">-h</code> option prints a
        full list of parameters.  Note that the DNSSEC tools require the
        keyset files to be in the working directory or the
        directory specified by the <code class="option">-d</code> option, and
        that the tools shipped with BIND 9.2.x and earlier are not compatible
        with the current ones.
      </p>
<p>
        There must also be communication with the administrators of
        the parent and/or child zone to transmit keys.  A zone's security
        status must be indicated by the parent zone for a DNSSEC capable
        resolver to trust its data.  This is done through the presence
        or absence of a <code class="literal">DS</code> record at the
        delegation
        point.
      </p>
<p>
        For other servers to trust data in this zone, they must
        either be statically configured with this zone's zone key or the
        zone key of another zone above this one in the DNS tree.
      </p>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="dnssec_keys"></a>Generating Keys</h3></div></div></div>
<p>
          The <span class="command"><strong>dnssec-keygen</strong></span> program is used to
          generate keys.
        </p>
<p>
          A secure zone must contain one or more zone keys.  The
          zone keys will sign all other records in the zone, as well as
          the zone keys of any secure delegated zones.  Zone keys must
          have the same name as the zone, a name type of
          <span class="command"><strong>ZONE</strong></span>, and must be usable for
          authentication.
          It is recommended that zone keys use a cryptographic algorithm
          designated as "mandatory to implement" by the IETF; currently
          the only one is RSASHA1.
        </p>
<p>
          The following command will generate a 768-bit RSASHA1 key for
          the <code class="filename">child.example</code> zone:
        </p>
<p>
          <strong class="userinput"><code>dnssec-keygen -a RSASHA1 -b 768 -n ZONE child.example.</code></strong>
        </p>
<p>
          Two output files will be produced:
          <code class="filename">Kchild.example.+005+12345.key</code> and
          <code class="filename">Kchild.example.+005+12345.private</code>
          (where
          12345 is an example of a key tag).  The key filenames contain
          the key name (<code class="filename">child.example.</code>),
          algorithm (3
          is DSA, 1 is RSAMD5, 5 is RSASHA1, etc.), and the key tag (12345 in
          this case).
          The private key (in the <code class="filename">.private</code>
          file) is
          used to generate signatures, and the public key (in the
          <code class="filename">.key</code> file) is used for signature
          verification.
        </p>
<p>
          To generate another key with the same properties (but with
          a different key tag), repeat the above command.
        </p>
<p>
          The <span class="command"><strong>dnssec-keyfromlabel</strong></span> program is used
          to get a key pair from a crypto hardware and build the key
          files. Its usage is similar to <span class="command"><strong>dnssec-keygen</strong></span>.
        </p>
<p>
          The public keys should be inserted into the zone file by
          including the <code class="filename">.key</code> files using
          <span class="command"><strong>$INCLUDE</strong></span> statements.
        </p>
</div>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="dnssec_signing"></a>Signing the Zone</h3></div></div></div>
<p>
          The <span class="command"><strong>dnssec-signzone</strong></span> program is used
          to sign a zone.
        </p>
<p>
          Any <code class="filename">keyset</code> files corresponding to
          secure subzones should be present.  The zone signer will
          generate <code class="literal">NSEC</code>, <code class="literal">NSEC3</code>
          and <code class="literal">RRSIG</code> records for the zone, as
          well as <code class="literal">DS</code> for the child zones if
          <code class="literal">'-g'</code> is specified.  If <code class="literal">'-g'</code>
          is not specified, then DS RRsets for the secure child
          zones need to be added manually.
        </p>
<p>
          The following command signs the zone, assuming it is in a
          file called <code class="filename">zone.child.example</code>.  By
                default, all zone keys which have an available private key are
                used to generate signatures.
        </p>
<p>
          <strong class="userinput"><code>dnssec-signzone -o child.example zone.child.example</code></strong>
        </p>
<p>
          One output file is produced:
          <code class="filename">zone.child.example.signed</code>.  This
          file
          should be referenced by <code class="filename">named.conf</code>
          as the
          input file for the zone.
        </p>
<p><span class="command"><strong>dnssec-signzone</strong></span>
          will also produce a keyset and dsset files and optionally a
          dlvset file.  These are used to provide the parent zone
          administrators with the <code class="literal">DNSKEYs</code> (or their
          corresponding <code class="literal">DS</code> records) that are the
          secure entry point to the zone.
        </p>
</div>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="dnssec_config"></a>Configuring Servers</h3></div></div></div>
<p>
          To enable <span class="command"><strong>named</strong></span> to respond appropriately
          to DNS requests from DNSSEC aware clients,
          <span class="command"><strong>dnssec-enable</strong></span> must be set to yes.
          (This is the default setting.)
        </p>
<p>
          To enable <span class="command"><strong>named</strong></span> to validate answers from
          other servers, the <span class="command"><strong>dnssec-enable</strong></span> option
          must be set to <strong class="userinput"><code>yes</code></strong>, and the
          <span class="command"><strong>dnssec-validation</strong></span> options must be set to
          <strong class="userinput"><code>yes</code></strong> or <strong class="userinput"><code>auto</code></strong>.
        </p>
<p>
          If <span class="command"><strong>dnssec-validation</strong></span> is set to
          <strong class="userinput"><code>auto</code></strong>, then a default
          trust anchor for the DNS root zone will be used.
          If it is set to <strong class="userinput"><code>yes</code></strong>, however,
          then at least one trust anchor must be configured
          with a <span class="command"><strong>trusted-keys</strong></span> or
          <span class="command"><strong>managed-keys</strong></span> statement in
          <code class="filename">named.conf</code>, or DNSSEC validation
          will not occur.  The default setting is
          <strong class="userinput"><code>yes</code></strong>.
        </p>
<p>
          <span class="command"><strong>trusted-keys</strong></span> are copies of DNSKEY RRs
          for zones that are used to form the first link in the
          cryptographic chain of trust.  All keys listed in
          <span class="command"><strong>trusted-keys</strong></span> (and corresponding zones)
          are deemed to exist and only the listed keys will be used
          to validated the DNSKEY RRset that they are from.
        </p>
<p>
          <span class="command"><strong>managed-keys</strong></span> are trusted keys which are
          automatically kept up to date via RFC 5011 trust anchor
          maintenance.
        </p>
<p>
          <span class="command"><strong>trusted-keys</strong></span> and
          <span class="command"><strong>managed-keys</strong></span> are described in more detail
          later in this document.
        </p>
<p>
          Unlike <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 8, <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym>
          9 does not verify signatures on load, so zone keys for
          authoritative zones do not need to be specified in the
          configuration file.
        </p>
<p>
          After DNSSEC gets established, a typical DNSSEC configuration
          will look something like the following.  It has one or
          more public keys for the root.  This allows answers from
          outside the organization to be validated.  It will also
          have several keys for parts of the namespace the organization
          controls.  These are here to ensure that <span class="command"><strong>named</strong></span>
          is immune to compromises in the DNSSEC components of the security
          of parent zones.
        </p>
<pre class="programlisting">
managed-keys {
        /* Root Key */
        "." initial-key 257 3 3 "BNY4wrWM1nCfJ+CXd0rVXyYmobt7sEEfK3clRbGaTwS
                                 JxrGkxJWoZu6I7PzJu/E9gx4UC1zGAHlXKdE4zYIpRh
                                 aBKnvcC2U9mZhkdUpd1Vso/HAdjNe8LmMlnzY3zy2Xy
                                 4klWOADTPzSv9eamj8V18PHGjBLaVtYvk/ln5ZApjYg
                                 hf+6fElrmLkdaz MQ2OCnACR817DF4BBa7UR/beDHyp
                                 5iWTXWSi6XmoJLbG9Scqc7l70KDqlvXR3M/lUUVRbke
                                 g1IPJSidmK3ZyCllh4XSKbje/45SKucHgnwU5jefMtq
                                 66gKodQj+MiA21AfUVe7u99WzTLzY3qlxDhxYQQ20FQ
                                 97S+LKUTpQcq27R7AT3/V5hRQxScINqwcz4jYqZD2fQ
                                 dgxbcDTClU0CRBdiieyLMNzXG3";
};

trusted-keys {
        /* Key for our organization's forward zone */
        example.com. 257 3 5 "AwEAAaxPMcR2x0HbQV4WeZB6oEDX+r0QM6
                              5KbhTjrW1ZaARmPhEZZe3Y9ifgEuq7vZ/z
                              GZUdEGNWy+JZzus0lUptwgjGwhUS1558Hb
                              4JKUbbOTcM8pwXlj0EiX3oDFVmjHO444gL
                              kBOUKUf/mC7HvfwYH/Be22GnClrinKJp1O
                              g4ywzO9WglMk7jbfW33gUKvirTHr25GL7S
                              TQUzBb5Usxt8lgnyTUHs1t3JwCY5hKZ6Cq
                              FxmAVZP20igTixin/1LcrgX/KMEGd/biuv
                              F4qJCyduieHukuY3H4XMAcR+xia2nIUPvm
                              /oyWR8BW/hWdzOvnSCThlHf3xiYleDbt/o
                              1OTQ09A0=";

        /* Key for our reverse zone. */
        2.0.192.IN-ADDRPA.NET. 257 3 5 "AQOnS4xn/IgOUpBPJ3bogzwc
                                       xOdNax071L18QqZnQQQAVVr+i
                                       LhGTnNGp3HoWQLUIzKrJVZ3zg
                                       gy3WwNT6kZo6c0tszYqbtvchm
                                       gQC8CzKojM/W16i6MG/eafGU3
                                       siaOdS0yOI6BgPsw+YZdzlYMa
                                       IJGf4M4dyoKIhzdZyQ2bYQrjy
                                       Q4LB0lC7aOnsMyYKHHYeRvPxj
                                       IQXmdqgOJGq+vsevG06zW+1xg
                                       YJh9rCIfnm1GX/KMgxLPG2vXT
                                       D/RnLX+D3T3UL7HJYHJhAZD5L
                                       59VvjSPsZJHeDCUyWYrvPZesZ
                                       DIRvhDD52SKvbheeTJUm6Ehkz
                                       ytNN2SN96QRk8j/iI8ib";
};

options {
        ...
        dnssec-enable yes;
        dnssec-validation yes;
};
</pre>
<div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;">
<h3 class="title">Note</h3>
<p>
          None of the keys listed in this example are valid.  In particular,
          the root key is not valid.
        </p>
</div>
<p>
          When DNSSEC validation is enabled and properly configured,
          the resolver will reject any answers from signed, secure zones
          which fail to validate, and will return SERVFAIL to the client.
        </p>
<p>
          Responses may fail to validate for any of several reasons,
          including missing, expired, or invalid signatures, a key which
          does not match the DS RRset in the parent zone, or an insecure
          response from a zone which, according to its parent, should have
          been secure.
        </p>
<div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;">
<h3 class="title">Note</h3>
<p>
            When the validator receives a response from an unsigned zone
            that has a signed parent, it must confirm with the parent
            that the zone was intentionally left unsigned.  It does
            this by verifying, via signed and validated NSEC/NSEC3 records,
            that the parent zone contains no DS records for the child.
          </p>
<p>
            If the validator <span class="emphasis"><em>can</em></span> prove that the zone
            is insecure, then the response is accepted.  However, if it
            cannot, then it must assume an insecure response to be a
            forgery; it rejects the response and logs an error.
          </p>
<p>
            The logged error reads "insecurity proof failed" and
            "got insecure response; parent indicates it should be secure".
            (Prior to BIND 9.7, the logged error was "not insecure".
            This referred to the zone, not the response.)
          </p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both">
<a name="dnssec.dynamic.zones"></a>DNSSEC, Dynamic Zones, and Automatic Signing</h2></div></div></div>
<p>As of BIND 9.7.0 it is possible to change a dynamic zone
  from insecure to signed and back again. A secure zone can use
  either NSEC or NSEC3 chains.</p>
<div class="section"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.10.3"></a>Converting from insecure to secure</h3></div></div></div></div>
<p>Changing a zone from insecure to secure can be done in two
  ways: using a dynamic DNS update, or the
  <span class="command"><strong>auto-dnssec</strong></span> zone option.</p>
<p>For either method, you need to configure
  <span class="command"><strong>named</strong></span> so that it can see the
  <code class="filename">K*</code> files which contain the public and private
  parts of the keys that will be used to sign the zone. These files
  will have been generated by
  <span class="command"><strong>dnssec-keygen</strong></span>. You can do this by placing them
  in the key-directory, as specified in
  <code class="filename">named.conf</code>:</p>
<pre class="programlisting">
        zone example.net {
                type master;
                update-policy local;
                file "dynamic/example.net/example.net";
                key-directory "dynamic/example.net";
        };
</pre>
<p>If one KSK and one ZSK DNSKEY key have been generated, this
  configuration will cause all records in the zone to be signed
  with the ZSK, and the DNSKEY RRset to be signed with the KSK as
  well. An NSEC chain will be generated as part of the initial
  signing process.</p>
<div class="section"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.10.8"></a>Dynamic DNS update method</h3></div></div></div></div>
<p>To insert the keys via dynamic update:</p>
<pre class="screen">
        % nsupdate
        &gt; ttl 3600
        &gt; update add example.net DNSKEY 256 3 7 AwEAAZn17pUF0KpbPA2c7Gz76Vb18v0teKT3EyAGfBfL8eQ8al35zz3Y I1m/SAQBxIqMfLtIwqWPdgthsu36azGQAX8=
        &gt; update add example.net DNSKEY 257 3 7 AwEAAd/7odU/64o2LGsifbLtQmtO8dFDtTAZXSX2+X3e/UNlq9IHq3Y0 XtC0Iuawl/qkaKVxXe2lo8Ct+dM6UehyCqk=
        &gt; send
</pre>
<p>While the update request will complete almost immediately,
  the zone will not be completely signed until
  <span class="command"><strong>named</strong></span> has had time to walk the zone and
  generate the NSEC and RRSIG records. The NSEC record at the apex
  will be added last, to signal that there is a complete NSEC
  chain.</p>
<p>If you wish to sign using NSEC3 instead of NSEC, you should
  add an NSEC3PARAM record to the initial update request. If you
  wish the NSEC3 chain to have the OPTOUT bit set, set it in the
  flags field of the NSEC3PARAM record.</p>
<pre class="screen">
        % nsupdate
        &gt; ttl 3600
        &gt; update add example.net DNSKEY 256 3 7 AwEAAZn17pUF0KpbPA2c7Gz76Vb18v0teKT3EyAGfBfL8eQ8al35zz3Y I1m/SAQBxIqMfLtIwqWPdgthsu36azGQAX8=
        &gt; update add example.net DNSKEY 257 3 7 AwEAAd/7odU/64o2LGsifbLtQmtO8dFDtTAZXSX2+X3e/UNlq9IHq3Y0 XtC0Iuawl/qkaKVxXe2lo8Ct+dM6UehyCqk=
        &gt; update add example.net NSEC3PARAM 1 1 100 1234567890
        &gt; send
</pre>
<p>Again, this update request will complete almost
  immediately; however, the record won't show up until
  <span class="command"><strong>named</strong></span> has had a chance to build/remove the
  relevant chain. A private type record will be created to record
  the state of the operation (see below for more details), and will
  be removed once the operation completes.</p>
<p>While the initial signing and NSEC/NSEC3 chain generation
  is happening, other updates are possible as well.</p>
<div class="section"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.10.16"></a>Fully automatic zone signing</h3></div></div></div></div>
<p>To enable automatic signing, add the
  <span class="command"><strong>auto-dnssec</strong></span> option to the zone statement in
  <code class="filename">named.conf</code>.
  <span class="command"><strong>auto-dnssec</strong></span> has two possible arguments:
  <code class="constant">allow</code> or
  <code class="constant">maintain</code>.</p>
<p>With
  <span class="command"><strong>auto-dnssec allow</strong></span>,
  <span class="command"><strong>named</strong></span> can search the key directory for keys
  matching the zone, insert them into the zone, and use them to
  sign the zone. It will do so only when it receives an
  <span class="command"><strong>rndc sign &lt;zonename&gt;</strong></span>.</p>
<p>
  
  <span class="command"><strong>auto-dnssec maintain</strong></span> includes the above
  functionality, but will also automatically adjust the zone's
  DNSKEY records on schedule according to the keys' timing metadata.
  (See <a class="xref" href="man.dnssec-keygen.html" title="dnssec-keygen"><span class="refentrytitle"><span class="application">dnssec-keygen</span></span>(8)</a> and
  <a class="xref" href="man.dnssec-settime.html" title="dnssec-settime"><span class="refentrytitle"><span class="application">dnssec-settime</span></span>(8)</a> for more information.)
  </p>
<p>
  <span class="command"><strong>named</strong></span> will periodically search the key directory
  for keys matching the zone, and if the keys' metadata indicates
  that any change should be made the zone, such as adding, removing,
  or revoking a key, then that action will be carried out.  By default,
  the key directory is checked for changes every 60 minutes; this period
  can be adjusted with the <code class="option">dnssec-loadkeys-interval</code>, up
  to a maximum of 24 hours.  The <span class="command"><strong>rndc loadkeys</strong></span> forces
  <span class="command"><strong>named</strong></span> to check for key updates immediately.
  </p>
<p>
  If keys are present in the key directory the first time the zone
  is loaded, the zone will be signed immediately, without waiting for an
  <span class="command"><strong>rndc sign</strong></span> or <span class="command"><strong>rndc loadkeys</strong></span>
  command. (Those commands can still be used when there are unscheduled
  key changes, however.)
  </p>
<p>
  When new keys are added to a zone, the TTL is set to match that
  of any existing DNSKEY RRset. If there is no existing DNSKEY RRset,
  then the TTL will be set to the TTL specified when the key was
  created (using the <span class="command"><strong>dnssec-keygen -L</strong></span> option), if
  any, or to the SOA TTL.
  </p>
<p>
  If you wish the zone to be signed using NSEC3 instead of NSEC,
  submit an NSEC3PARAM record via dynamic update prior to the
  scheduled publication and activation of the keys.  If you wish the
  NSEC3 chain to have the OPTOUT bit set, set it in the flags field
  of the NSEC3PARAM record.  The NSEC3PARAM record will not appear in
  the zone immediately, but it will be stored for later reference.  When
  the zone is signed and the NSEC3 chain is completed, the NSEC3PARAM
  record will appear in the zone.
  </p>
<p>Using the
  <span class="command"><strong>auto-dnssec</strong></span> option requires the zone to be
  configured to allow dynamic updates, by adding an
  <span class="command"><strong>allow-update</strong></span> or
  <span class="command"><strong>update-policy</strong></span> statement to the zone
  configuration. If this has not been done, the configuration will
  fail.</p>
<div class="section"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.10.25"></a>Private-type records</h3></div></div></div></div>
<p>The state of the signing process is signaled by
  private-type records (with a default type value of 65534). When
  signing is complete, these records will have a nonzero value for
  the final octet (for those records which have a nonzero initial
  octet).</p>
<p>The private type record format: If the first octet is
  non-zero then the record indicates that the zone needs to be
  signed with the key matching the record, or that all signatures
  that match the record should be removed.</p>
<p>
    </p>
<div class="literallayout"><p><br>
<br>
  algorithm (octet 1)<br>
  key id in network order (octet 2 and 3)<br>
  removal flag (octet 4)<br>
  complete flag (octet 5)<br>
</p></div>
<p>
  </p>
<p>Only records flagged as "complete" can be removed via
  dynamic update. Attempts to remove other private type records
  will be silently ignored.</p>
<p>If the first octet is zero (this is a reserved algorithm
  number that should never appear in a DNSKEY record) then the
  record indicates changes to the NSEC3 chains are in progress. The
  rest of the record contains an NSEC3PARAM record. The flag field
  tells what operation to perform based on the flag bits.</p>
<p>
    </p>
<div class="literallayout"><p><br>
<br>
  0x01 OPTOUT<br>
  0x80 CREATE<br>
  0x40 REMOVE<br>
  0x20 NONSEC<br>
</p></div>
<p>
  </p>
<div class="section"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.10.32"></a>DNSKEY rollovers</h3></div></div></div></div>
<p>As with insecure-to-secure conversions, rolling DNSSEC
  keys can be done in two ways: using a dynamic DNS update, or the
  <span class="command"><strong>auto-dnssec</strong></span> zone option.</p>
<div class="section"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.10.34"></a>Dynamic DNS update method</h3></div></div></div></div>
<p> To perform key rollovers via dynamic update, you need to add
  the <code class="filename">K*</code> files for the new keys so that
  <span class="command"><strong>named</strong></span> can find them. You can then add the new
  DNSKEY RRs via dynamic update.
  <span class="command"><strong>named</strong></span> will then cause the zone to be signed
  with the new keys. When the signing is complete the private type
  records will be updated so that the last octet is non
  zero.</p>
<p>If this is for a KSK you need to inform the parent and any
  trust anchor repositories of the new KSK.</p>
<p>You should then wait for the maximum TTL in the zone before
  removing the old DNSKEY. If it is a KSK that is being updated,
  you also need to wait for the DS RRset in the parent to be
  updated and its TTL to expire. This ensures that all clients will
  be able to verify at least one signature when you remove the old
  DNSKEY.</p>
<p>The old DNSKEY can be removed via UPDATE. Take care to
  specify the correct key.
  <span class="command"><strong>named</strong></span> will clean out any signatures generated
  by the old key after the update completes.</p>
<div class="section"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.10.39"></a>Automatic key rollovers</h3></div></div></div></div>
<p>When a new key reaches its activation date (as set by
  <span class="command"><strong>dnssec-keygen</strong></span> or <span class="command"><strong>dnssec-settime</strong></span>),
  if the <span class="command"><strong>auto-dnssec</strong></span> zone option is set to
  <code class="constant">maintain</code>, <span class="command"><strong>named</strong></span> will
  automatically carry out the key rollover.  If the key's algorithm
  has not previously been used to sign the zone, then the zone will
  be fully signed as quickly as possible.  However, if the new key
  is replacing an existing key of the same algorithm, then the
  zone will be re-signed incrementally, with signatures from the
  old key being replaced with signatures from the new key as their
  signature validity periods expire.  By default, this rollover
  completes in 30 days, after which it will be safe to remove the
  old key from the DNSKEY RRset.</p>
<div class="section"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.10.41"></a>NSEC3PARAM rollovers via UPDATE</h3></div></div></div></div>
<p>Add the new NSEC3PARAM record via dynamic update. When the
  new NSEC3 chain has been generated, the NSEC3PARAM flag field
  will be zero. At this point you can remove the old NSEC3PARAM
  record. The old chain will be removed after the update request
  completes.</p>
<div class="section"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.10.43"></a>Converting from NSEC to NSEC3</h3></div></div></div></div>
<p>To do this, you just need to add an NSEC3PARAM record. When
  the conversion is complete, the NSEC chain will have been removed
  and the NSEC3PARAM record will have a zero flag field. The NSEC3
  chain will be generated before the NSEC chain is
  destroyed.</p>
<div class="section"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.10.45"></a>Converting from NSEC3 to NSEC</h3></div></div></div></div>
<p>To do this, use <span class="command"><strong>nsupdate</strong></span> to
  remove all NSEC3PARAM records with a zero flag
  field. The NSEC chain will be generated before the NSEC3 chain is
  removed.</p>
<div class="section"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.10.47"></a>Converting from secure to insecure</h3></div></div></div></div>
<p>To convert a signed zone to unsigned using dynamic DNS,
  delete all the DNSKEY records from the zone apex using
  <span class="command"><strong>nsupdate</strong></span>. All signatures, NSEC or NSEC3 chains,
  and associated NSEC3PARAM records will be removed automatically.
  This will take place after the update request completes.</p>
<p> This requires the
  <span class="command"><strong>dnssec-secure-to-insecure</strong></span> option to be set to
  <strong class="userinput"><code>yes</code></strong> in
  <code class="filename">named.conf</code>.</p>
<p>In addition, if the <span class="command"><strong>auto-dnssec maintain</strong></span>
  zone statement is used, it should be removed or changed to
  <span class="command"><strong>allow</strong></span> instead (or it will re-sign).
  </p>
<div class="section"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.10.51"></a>Periodic re-signing</h3></div></div></div></div>
<p>In any secure zone which supports dynamic updates, named
  will periodically re-sign RRsets which have not been re-signed as
  a result of some update action. The signature lifetimes will be
  adjusted so as to spread the re-sign load over time rather than
  all at once.</p>
<div class="section"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.10.53"></a>NSEC3 and OPTOUT</h3></div></div></div></div>
<p>
  <span class="command"><strong>named</strong></span> only supports creating new NSEC3 chains
  where all the NSEC3 records in the zone have the same OPTOUT
  state.
  <span class="command"><strong>named</strong></span> supports UPDATES to zones where the NSEC3
  records in the chain have mixed OPTOUT state.
  <span class="command"><strong>named</strong></span> does not support changing the OPTOUT
  state of an individual NSEC3 record, the entire chain needs to be
  changed if the OPTOUT state of an individual NSEC3 needs to be
  changed.</p>
</div>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both">
<a name="rfc5011.support"></a>Dynamic Trust Anchor Management</h2></div></div></div>
<p>BIND 9.7.0 introduces support for RFC 5011, dynamic trust
  anchor management. Using this feature allows
  <span class="command"><strong>named</strong></span> to keep track of changes to critical
  DNSSEC keys without any need for the operator to make changes to
  configuration files.</p>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.11.3"></a>Validating Resolver</h3></div></div></div>
<p>To configure a validating resolver to use RFC 5011 to
    maintain a trust anchor, configure the trust anchor using a
    <span class="command"><strong>managed-keys</strong></span> statement. Information about
    this can be found in
    <a class="xref" href="Bv9ARM.ch06.html#managed-keys" title="managed-keys Statement Definition and Usage">the section called &#8220;<span class="command"><strong>managed-keys</strong></span> Statement Definition
            and Usage&#8221;</a>.</p>
</div>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.11.4"></a>Authoritative Server</h3></div></div></div>
<p>To set up an authoritative zone for RFC 5011 trust anchor
    maintenance, generate two (or more) key signing keys (KSKs) for
    the zone. Sign the zone with one of them; this is the "active"
    KSK. All KSK's which do not sign the zone are "stand-by"
    keys.</p>
<p>Any validating resolver which is configured to use the
    active KSK as an RFC 5011-managed trust anchor will take note
    of the stand-by KSKs in the zone's DNSKEY RRset, and store them
    for future reference. The resolver will recheck the zone
    periodically, and after 30 days, if the new key is still there,
    then the key will be accepted by the resolver as a valid trust
    anchor for the zone. Any time after this 30-day acceptance
    timer has completed, the active KSK can be revoked, and the
    zone can be "rolled over" to the newly accepted key.</p>
<p>The easiest way to place a stand-by key in a zone is to
    use the "smart signing" features of
    <span class="command"><strong>dnssec-keygen</strong></span> and
    <span class="command"><strong>dnssec-signzone</strong></span>. If a key with a publication
    date in the past, but an activation date which is unset or in
    the future, "
    <span class="command"><strong>dnssec-signzone -S</strong></span>" will include the DNSKEY
    record in the zone, but will not sign with it:</p>
<pre class="screen">
$ <strong class="userinput"><code>dnssec-keygen -K keys -f KSK -P now -A now+2y example.net</code></strong>
$ <strong class="userinput"><code>dnssec-signzone -S -K keys example.net</code></strong>
</pre>
<p>To revoke a key, the new command
    <span class="command"><strong>dnssec-revoke</strong></span> has been added. This adds the
    REVOKED bit to the key flags and re-generates the
    <code class="filename">K*.key</code> and
    <code class="filename">K*.private</code> files.</p>
<p>After revoking the active key, the zone must be signed
    with both the revoked KSK and the new active KSK. (Smart
    signing takes care of this automatically.)</p>
<p>Once a key has been revoked and used to sign the DNSKEY
    RRset in which it appears, that key will never again be
    accepted as a valid trust anchor by the resolver. However,
    validation can proceed using the new active key (which had been
    accepted by the resolver when it was a stand-by key).</p>
<p>See RFC 5011 for more details on key rollover
    scenarios.</p>
<p>When a key has been revoked, its key ID changes,
    increasing by 128, and wrapping around at 65535. So, for
    example, the key "<code class="filename">Kexample.com.+005+10000</code>" becomes
    "<code class="filename">Kexample.com.+005+10128</code>".</p>
<p>If two keys have ID's exactly 128 apart, and one is
    revoked, then the two key ID's will collide, causing several
    problems. To prevent this,
    <span class="command"><strong>dnssec-keygen</strong></span> will not generate a new key if
    another key is present which may collide. This checking will
    only occur if the new keys are written to the same directory
    which holds all other keys in use for that zone.</p>
<p>Older versions of BIND 9 did not have this precaution.
    Exercise caution if using key revocation on keys that were
    generated by previous releases, or if using keys stored in
    multiple directories or on multiple machines.</p>
<p>It is expected that a future release of BIND 9 will
    address this problem in a different way, by storing revoked
    keys with their original unrevoked key ID's.</p>
</div>
</div>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both">
<a name="pkcs11"></a>PKCS#11 (Cryptoki) support</h2></div></div></div>
<p>
    PKCS#11 (Public Key Cryptography Standard #11) defines a
    platform-independent API for the control of hardware security
    modules (HSMs) and other cryptographic support devices.
  </p>
<p>
    BIND 9 is known to work with three HSMs: The AEP Keyper, which has
    been tested with Debian Linux, Solaris x86 and Windows Server 2003;
    the Thales nShield, tested with Debian Linux; and the Sun SCA 6000
    cryptographic acceleration board, tested with Solaris x86.  In
    addition, BIND can be used with all current versions of SoftHSM,
    a software-based HSM simulator library produced by the OpenDNSSEC
    project.
  </p>
<p>
    PKCS#11 makes use of a "provider library": a dynamically loadable
    library which provides a low-level PKCS#11 interface to drive the HSM
    hardware.  The PKCS#11 provider library comes from the HSM vendor, and
    it is specific to the HSM to be controlled.
  </p>
<p>
    There are two available mechanisms for PKCS#11 support in BIND 9:
    OpenSSL-based PKCS#11 and native PKCS#11.  When using the first
    mechanism, BIND uses a modified version of OpenSSL, which loads
    the provider library and operates the HSM indirectly; any
    cryptographic operations not supported by the HSM can be carried
    out by OpenSSL instead.  The second mechanism enables BIND to bypass
    OpenSSL completely; BIND loads the provider library itself, and uses
    the PKCS#11 API to drive the HSM directly.
  </p>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.12.6"></a>Prerequisites</h3></div></div></div>
<p>
      See the documentation provided by your HSM vendor for
      information about installing, initializing, testing and
      troubleshooting the HSM.
    </p>
</div>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.12.7"></a>Native PKCS#11</h3></div></div></div>
<p>
      Native PKCS#11 mode will only work with an HSM capable of carrying
      out <span class="emphasis"><em>every</em></span> cryptographic operation BIND 9 may
      need. The HSM's provider library must have a complete implementation
      of the PKCS#11 API, so that all these functions are accessible. As of
      this writing, only the Thales nShield HSM and SoftHSMv2 can be used
      in this fashion.  For other HSMs, including the AEP Keyper, Sun SCA
      6000 and older versions of SoftHSM, use OpenSSL-based PKCS#11.
      (Note: Eventually, when more HSMs become capable of supporting
      native PKCS#11, it is expected that OpenSSL-based PKCS#11 will
      be deprecated.)
    </p>
<p>
      To build BIND with native PKCS#11, configure as follows:
    </p>
<pre class="screen">
$ <strong class="userinput"><code>cd bind9</code></strong>
$ <strong class="userinput"><code>./configure --enable-native-pkcs11 \
    --with-pkcs11=<em class="replaceable"><code>provider-library-path</code></em></code></strong>
    </pre>
<p>
      This will cause all BIND tools, including <span class="command"><strong>named</strong></span>
      and the <span class="command"><strong>dnssec-*</strong></span> and <span class="command"><strong>pkcs11-*</strong></span>
      tools, to use the PKCS#11 provider library specified in
      <em class="replaceable"><code>provider-library-path</code></em> for cryptography.
      (The provider library path can be overridden using the
      <code class="option">-E</code> in <span class="command"><strong>named</strong></span> and the
      <span class="command"><strong>dnssec-*</strong></span> tools, or the <code class="option">-m</code> in
      the <span class="command"><strong>pkcs11-*</strong></span> tools.)
    </p>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.12.7.6"></a>Building SoftHSMv2</h4></div></div></div>
<p>
	SoftHSMv2, the latest development version of SoftHSM, is available
	from
	<a class="link" href="https://github.com/opendnssec/SoftHSMv2" target="_top">
	  https://github.com/opendnssec/SoftHSMv2
	</a>.
	It is a software library developed by the OpenDNSSEC project
	(<a class="link" href="http://www.opendnssec.org" target="_top">
	  http://www.opendnssec.org
	</a>)
	which provides a PKCS#11 interface to a virtual HSM, implemented in
	the form of a SQLite3 database on the local filesystem.  It provides
	less security than a true HSM, but it allows you to experiment with
	native PKCS#11 when an HSM is not available.  SoftHSMv2 can be
	configured to use either OpenSSL or the Botan library to perform
	cryptographic functions, but when using it for native PKCS#11 in
	BIND, OpenSSL is required.
      </p>
<p>
	By default, the SoftHSMv2 configuration file is
	<em class="replaceable"><code>prefix</code></em>/etc/softhsm2.conf (where
	<em class="replaceable"><code>prefix</code></em> is configured at compile time).
	This location can be overridden by the SOFTHSM2_CONF environment
	variable.  The SoftHSMv2 cryptographic store must be installed and
	initialized before using it with BIND.
      </p>
<pre class="screen">
$ <strong class="userinput"><code> cd SoftHSMv2 </code></strong>
$ <strong class="userinput"><code> configure --with-crypto-backend=openssl --prefix=/opt/pkcs11/usr --enable-gost </code></strong>
$ <strong class="userinput"><code> make </code></strong>
$ <strong class="userinput"><code> make install </code></strong>
$ <strong class="userinput"><code> /opt/pkcs11/usr/bin/softhsm-util --init-token 0 --slot 0 --label softhsmv2 </code></strong>
      </pre>
</div>
</div>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.12.8"></a>OpenSSL-based PKCS#11</h3></div></div></div>
<p>
      OpenSSL-based PKCS#11 mode uses a modified version of the
      OpenSSL library; stock OpenSSL does not fully support PKCS#11.
      ISC provides a patch to OpenSSL to correct this.  This patch is
      based on work originally done by the OpenSolaris project; it has been
      modified by ISC to provide new features such as PIN management and
      key-by-reference.
    </p>
<p>
      There are two "flavors" of PKCS#11 support provided by
      the patched OpenSSL, one of which must be chosen at
      configuration time. The correct choice depends on the HSM
      hardware:
    </p>
<div class="itemizedlist"><ul class="itemizedlist" style="list-style-type: disc; ">
<li class="listitem"><p>
	  Use 'crypto-accelerator' with HSMs that have hardware
	  cryptographic acceleration features, such as the SCA 6000
	  board. This causes OpenSSL to run all supported
	  cryptographic operations in the HSM.
	</p></li>
<li class="listitem"><p>
	  Use 'sign-only' with HSMs that are designed to
	  function primarily as secure key storage devices, but lack
	  hardware acceleration. These devices are highly secure, but
	  are not necessarily any faster at cryptography than the
	  system CPU &#8212; often, they are slower. It is therefore
	  most efficient to use them only for those cryptographic
	  functions that require access to the secured private key,
	  such as zone signing, and to use the system CPU for all
	  other computationally-intensive operations. The AEP Keyper
	  is an example of such a device.
	</p></li>
</ul></div>
<p>
      The modified OpenSSL code is included in the BIND 9 release,
      in the form of a context diff against the latest versions of
      OpenSSL.  OpenSSL 0.9.8, 1.0.0, 1.0.1 and 1.0.2 are supported;
      there are separate diffs for each version.  In the examples to
      follow, we use OpenSSL 0.9.8, but the same methods work with
      OpenSSL 1.0.0 through 1.0.2.
    </p>
<div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;">
<h3 class="title">Note</h3>
<p>
      The OpenSSL patches as of this writing (January 2016)
      support versions 0.9.8zh, 1.0.0t, 1.0.1q and 1.0.2f.
      ISC will provide updated patches as new versions of OpenSSL
      are released. The version number in the following examples
      is expected to change.
    </p>
</div>
<p>
      Before building BIND 9 with PKCS#11 support, it will be
      necessary to build OpenSSL with the patch in place, and configure
      it with the path to your HSM's PKCS#11 provider library.
    </p>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.12.8.8"></a>Patching OpenSSL</h4></div></div></div>
<pre class="screen">
$ <strong class="userinput"><code>wget <a class="link" href="" target="_top">http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-0.9.8zc.tar.gz</a></code></strong>
  </pre>
<p>Extract the tarball:</p>
<pre class="screen">
$ <strong class="userinput"><code>tar zxf openssl-0.9.8zc.tar.gz</code></strong>
</pre>
<p>Apply the patch from the BIND 9 release:</p>
<pre class="screen">
$ <strong class="userinput"><code>patch -p1 -d openssl-0.9.8zc \
	      &lt; bind9/bin/pkcs11/openssl-0.9.8zc-patch</code></strong>
</pre>
<div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;">
<h3 class="title">Note</h3>
<p>
	The patch file may not be compatible with the
	"patch" utility on all operating systems. You may need to
	install GNU patch.
      </p>
</div>
<p>
	When building OpenSSL, place it in a non-standard
	location so that it does not interfere with OpenSSL libraries
	elsewhere on the system. In the following examples, we choose
	to install into "/opt/pkcs11/usr". We will use this location
	when we configure BIND 9.
      </p>
<p>
	Later, when building BIND 9, the location of the custom-built
	OpenSSL library will need to be specified via configure.
      </p>
</div>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.12.8.9"></a>Building OpenSSL for the AEP Keyper on Linux</h4></div></div></div>
<p>
	The AEP Keyper is a highly secure key storage device,
	but does not provide hardware cryptographic acceleration. It
	can carry out cryptographic operations, but it is probably
	slower than your system's CPU. Therefore, we choose the
	'sign-only' flavor when building OpenSSL.
      </p>
<p>
	The Keyper-specific PKCS#11 provider library is
	delivered with the Keyper software. In this example, we place
	it /opt/pkcs11/usr/lib:
      </p>
<pre class="screen">
$ <strong class="userinput"><code>cp pkcs11.GCC4.0.2.so.4.05 /opt/pkcs11/usr/lib/libpkcs11.so</code></strong>
</pre>
<p>
	This library is only available for Linux as a 32-bit
	binary. If we are compiling on a 64-bit Linux system, it is
	necessary to force a 32-bit build, by specifying -m32 in the
	build options.
      </p>
<p>
	Finally, the Keyper library requires threads, so we
	must specify -pthread.
      </p>
<pre class="screen">
$ <strong class="userinput"><code>cd openssl-0.9.8zc</code></strong>
$ <strong class="userinput"><code>./Configure linux-generic32 -m32 -pthread \
	    --pk11-libname=/opt/pkcs11/usr/lib/libpkcs11.so \
	    --pk11-flavor=sign-only \
	    --prefix=/opt/pkcs11/usr</code></strong>
</pre>
<p>
	After configuring, run "<span class="command"><strong>make</strong></span>"
	and "<span class="command"><strong>make test</strong></span>". If "<span class="command"><strong>make
	test</strong></span>" fails with "pthread_atfork() not found", you forgot to
	add the -pthread above.
      </p>
</div>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.12.8.10"></a>Building OpenSSL for the SCA 6000 on Solaris</h4></div></div></div>
<p>
	The SCA-6000 PKCS#11 provider is installed as a system
	library, libpkcs11. It is a true crypto accelerator, up to 4
	times faster than any CPU, so the flavor shall be
	'crypto-accelerator'.
      </p>
<p>
	In this example, we are building on Solaris x86 on an
	AMD64 system.
      </p>
<pre class="screen">
$ <strong class="userinput"><code>cd openssl-0.9.8zc</code></strong>
$ <strong class="userinput"><code>./Configure solaris64-x86_64-cc \
	    --pk11-libname=/usr/lib/64/libpkcs11.so \
	    --pk11-flavor=crypto-accelerator \
	    --prefix=/opt/pkcs11/usr</code></strong>
</pre>
<p>
	(For a 32-bit build, use "solaris-x86-cc" and /usr/lib/libpkcs11.so.)
      </p>
<p>
	After configuring, run
	<span class="command"><strong>make</strong></span> and
	<span class="command"><strong>make test</strong></span>.
      </p>
</div>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.12.8.11"></a>Building OpenSSL for SoftHSM</h4></div></div></div>
<p>
	SoftHSM (version 1) is a software library developed by the
	OpenDNSSEC project
	(<a class="link" href="http://www.opendnssec.org" target="_top">
	  http://www.opendnssec.org
	</a>)
	which provides a
	PKCS#11 interface to a virtual HSM, implemented in the form of
	a SQLite3 database on the local filesystem.  SoftHSM uses
	the Botan library to perform cryptographic functions.  Though
	less secure than a true HSM, it can allow you to experiment
	with PKCS#11 when an HSM is not available.
      </p>
<p>
	The SoftHSM cryptographic store must be installed and
	initialized before using it with OpenSSL, and the SOFTHSM_CONF
	environment variable must always point to the SoftHSM configuration
	file:
      </p>
<pre class="screen">
$ <strong class="userinput"><code> cd softhsm-1.3.7 </code></strong>
$ <strong class="userinput"><code> configure --prefix=/opt/pkcs11/usr </code></strong>
$ <strong class="userinput"><code> make </code></strong>
$ <strong class="userinput"><code> make install </code></strong>
$ <strong class="userinput"><code> export SOFTHSM_CONF=/opt/pkcs11/softhsm.conf </code></strong>
$ <strong class="userinput"><code> echo "0:/opt/pkcs11/softhsm.db" &gt; $SOFTHSM_CONF </code></strong>
$ <strong class="userinput"><code> /opt/pkcs11/usr/bin/softhsm --init-token 0 --slot 0 --label softhsm </code></strong>
</pre>
<p>
	SoftHSM can perform all cryptographic operations, but
	since it only uses your system CPU, there is no advantage to using
	it for anything but signing.  Therefore, we choose the 'sign-only'
	flavor when building OpenSSL.
      </p>
<pre class="screen">
$ <strong class="userinput"><code>cd openssl-0.9.8zc</code></strong>
$ <strong class="userinput"><code>./Configure linux-x86_64 -pthread \
	    --pk11-libname=/opt/pkcs11/usr/lib/libsofthsm.so \
	    --pk11-flavor=sign-only \
	    --prefix=/opt/pkcs11/usr</code></strong>
</pre>
<p>
	After configuring, run "<span class="command"><strong>make</strong></span>"
	and "<span class="command"><strong>make test</strong></span>".
      </p>
</div>
<p>
      Once you have built OpenSSL, run
      "<span class="command"><strong>apps/openssl engine pkcs11</strong></span>" to confirm
      that PKCS#11 support was compiled in correctly. The output
      should be one of the following lines, depending on the flavor
      selected:
    </p>
<pre class="screen">
	(pkcs11) PKCS #11 engine support (sign only)
</pre>
<p>Or:</p>
<pre class="screen">
	(pkcs11) PKCS #11 engine support (crypto accelerator)
</pre>
<p>
      Next, run
      "<span class="command"><strong>apps/openssl engine pkcs11 -t</strong></span>". This will
      attempt to initialize the PKCS#11 engine. If it is able to
      do so successfully, it will report
      <span class="quote">&#8220;<span class="quote"><code class="literal">[ available ]</code></span>&#8221;</span>.
    </p>
<p>
      If the output is correct, run
      "<span class="command"><strong>make install</strong></span>" which will install the
      modified OpenSSL suite to <code class="filename">/opt/pkcs11/usr</code>.
    </p>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.12.8.18"></a>Configuring BIND 9 for Linux with the AEP Keyper</h4></div></div></div>
<p>
	To link with the PKCS#11 provider, threads must be
	enabled in the BIND 9 build.
      </p>
<p>
	The PKCS#11 library for the AEP Keyper is currently
	only available as a 32-bit binary. If we are building on a
	64-bit host, we must force a 32-bit build by adding "-m32" to
	the CC options on the "configure" command line.
      </p>
<pre class="screen">
$ <strong class="userinput"><code>cd ../bind9</code></strong>
$ <strong class="userinput"><code>./configure CC="gcc -m32" --enable-threads \
	   --with-openssl=/opt/pkcs11/usr \
	   --with-pkcs11=/opt/pkcs11/usr/lib/libpkcs11.so</code></strong>
</pre>
</div>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.12.8.19"></a>Configuring BIND 9 for Solaris with the SCA 6000</h4></div></div></div>
<p>
	To link with the PKCS#11 provider, threads must be
	enabled in the BIND 9 build.
      </p>
<pre class="screen">
$ <strong class="userinput"><code>cd ../bind9</code></strong>
$ <strong class="userinput"><code>./configure CC="cc -xarch=amd64" --enable-threads \
	    --with-openssl=/opt/pkcs11/usr \
	    --with-pkcs11=/usr/lib/64/libpkcs11.so</code></strong>
</pre>
<p>(For a 32-bit build, omit CC="cc -xarch=amd64".)</p>
<p>
	If configure complains about OpenSSL not working, you
	may have a 32/64-bit architecture mismatch. Or, you may have
	incorrectly specified the path to OpenSSL (it should be the
	same as the --prefix argument to the OpenSSL
	Configure).
      </p>
</div>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.12.8.20"></a>Configuring BIND 9 for SoftHSM</h4></div></div></div>
<pre class="screen">
$ <strong class="userinput"><code>cd ../bind9</code></strong>
$ <strong class="userinput"><code>./configure --enable-threads \
	   --with-openssl=/opt/pkcs11/usr \
	   --with-pkcs11=/opt/pkcs11/usr/lib/libsofthsm.so</code></strong>
</pre>
</div>
<p>
      After configuring, run
      "<span class="command"><strong>make</strong></span>",
      "<span class="command"><strong>make test</strong></span>" and
      "<span class="command"><strong>make install</strong></span>".
    </p>
<p>
      (Note: If "make test" fails in the "pkcs11" system test, you may
      have forgotten to set the SOFTHSM_CONF environment variable.)
    </p>
</div>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.12.9"></a>PKCS#11 Tools</h3></div></div></div>
<p>
      BIND 9 includes a minimal set of tools to operate the
      HSM, including
      <span class="command"><strong>pkcs11-keygen</strong></span> to generate a new key pair
      within the HSM,
      <span class="command"><strong>pkcs11-list</strong></span> to list objects currently
      available,
      <span class="command"><strong>pkcs11-destroy</strong></span> to remove objects, and
      <span class="command"><strong>pkcs11-tokens</strong></span> to list available tokens.
    </p>
<p>
      In UNIX/Linux builds, these tools are built only if BIND
      9 is configured with the --with-pkcs11 option. (Note: If
      --with-pkcs11 is set to "yes", rather than to the path of the
      PKCS#11 provider, then the tools will be built but the
      provider will be left undefined. Use the -m option or the
      PKCS11_PROVIDER environment variable to specify the path to the
      provider.)
    </p>
</div>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.12.10"></a>Using the HSM</h3></div></div></div>
<p>
      For OpenSSL-based PKCS#11, we must first set up the runtime
      environment so the OpenSSL and PKCS#11 libraries can be loaded:
    </p>
<pre class="screen">
$ <strong class="userinput"><code>export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/opt/pkcs11/usr/lib:${LD_LIBRARY_PATH}</code></strong>
</pre>
<p>
      This causes <span class="command"><strong>named</strong></span> and other binaries to load
      the OpenSSL library from <code class="filename">/opt/pkcs11/usr/lib</code>
      rather than from the default location.  This step is not necessary
      when using native PKCS#11.
    </p>
<p>
      Some HSMs require other environment variables to be set.
      For example, when operating an AEP Keyper, it is necessary to
      specify the location of the "machine" file, which stores
      information about the Keyper for use by the provider
      library. If the machine file is in
      <code class="filename">/opt/Keyper/PKCS11Provider/machine</code>,
      use:
    </p>
<pre class="screen">
$ <strong class="userinput"><code>export KEYPER_LIBRARY_PATH=/opt/Keyper/PKCS11Provider</code></strong>
</pre>
<p>
      Such environment variables must be set whenever running
      any tool that uses the HSM, including
      <span class="command"><strong>pkcs11-keygen</strong></span>,
      <span class="command"><strong>pkcs11-list</strong></span>,
      <span class="command"><strong>pkcs11-destroy</strong></span>,
      <span class="command"><strong>dnssec-keyfromlabel</strong></span>,
      <span class="command"><strong>dnssec-signzone</strong></span>,
      <span class="command"><strong>dnssec-keygen</strong></span>, and
      <span class="command"><strong>named</strong></span>.
    </p>
<p>
      We can now create and use keys in the HSM. In this case,
      we will create a 2048 bit key and give it the label
      "sample-ksk":
    </p>
<pre class="screen">
$ <strong class="userinput"><code>pkcs11-keygen -b 2048 -l sample-ksk</code></strong>
</pre>
<p>To confirm that the key exists:</p>
<pre class="screen">
$ <strong class="userinput"><code>pkcs11-list</code></strong>
Enter PIN:
object[0]: handle 2147483658 class 3 label[8] 'sample-ksk' id[0]
object[1]: handle 2147483657 class 2 label[8] 'sample-ksk' id[0]
</pre>
<p>
      Before using this key to sign a zone, we must create a
      pair of BIND 9 key files. The "dnssec-keyfromlabel" utility
      does this. In this case, we will be using the HSM key
      "sample-ksk" as the key-signing key for "example.net":
    </p>
<pre class="screen">
$ <strong class="userinput"><code>dnssec-keyfromlabel -l sample-ksk -f KSK example.net</code></strong>
</pre>
<p>
      The resulting K*.key and K*.private files can now be used
      to sign the zone. Unlike normal K* files, which contain both
      public and private key data, these files will contain only the
      public key data, plus an identifier for the private key which
      remains stored within the HSM. Signing with the private key takes
      place inside the HSM.
    </p>
<p>
      If you wish to generate a second key in the HSM for use
      as a zone-signing key, follow the same procedure above, using a
      different keylabel, a smaller key size, and omitting "-f KSK"
      from the dnssec-keyfromlabel arguments:
    </p>
<p>
      (Note: When using OpenSSL-based PKCS#11 the label is an arbitrary
      string which identifies the key.  With native PKCS#11, the label is
      a PKCS#11 URI string which may include other details about the key
      and the HSM, including its PIN. See
      <a class="xref" href="man.dnssec-keyfromlabel.html" title="dnssec-keyfromlabel"><span class="refentrytitle"><span class="application">dnssec-keyfromlabel</span></span>(8)</a> for details.)
    </p>
<pre class="screen">
$ <strong class="userinput"><code>pkcs11-keygen -b 1024 -l sample-zsk</code></strong>
$ <strong class="userinput"><code>dnssec-keyfromlabel -l sample-zsk example.net</code></strong>
</pre>
<p>
      Alternatively, you may prefer to generate a conventional
      on-disk key, using dnssec-keygen:
    </p>
<pre class="screen">
$ <strong class="userinput"><code>dnssec-keygen example.net</code></strong>
</pre>
<p>
      This provides less security than an HSM key, but since
      HSMs can be slow or cumbersome to use for security reasons, it
      may be more efficient to reserve HSM keys for use in the less
      frequent key-signing operation. The zone-signing key can be
      rolled more frequently, if you wish, to compensate for a
      reduction in key security.  (Note: When using native PKCS#11,
      there is no speed advantage to using on-disk keys, as cryptographic
      operations will be done by the HSM regardless.)
    </p>
<p>
      Now you can sign the zone. (Note: If not using the -S
      option to <span class="command"><strong>dnssec-signzone</strong></span>, it will be
      necessary to add the contents of both <code class="filename">K*.key</code>
      files to the zone master file before signing it.)
    </p>
<pre class="screen">
$ <strong class="userinput"><code>dnssec-signzone -S example.net</code></strong>
Enter PIN:
Verifying the zone using the following algorithms:
NSEC3RSASHA1.
Zone signing complete:
Algorithm: NSEC3RSASHA1: ZSKs: 1, KSKs: 1 active, 0 revoked, 0 stand-by
example.net.signed
</pre>
</div>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.12.11"></a>Specifying the engine on the command line</h3></div></div></div>
<p>
      When using OpenSSL-based PKCS#11, the "engine" to be used by
      OpenSSL can be specified in <span class="command"><strong>named</strong></span> and all of
      the BIND <span class="command"><strong>dnssec-*</strong></span> tools by using the "-E
      &lt;engine&gt;" command line option. If BIND 9 is built with
      the --with-pkcs11 option, this option defaults to "pkcs11".
      Specifying the engine will generally not be necessary unless
      for some reason you wish to use a different OpenSSL
      engine.
    </p>
<p>
      If you wish to disable use of the "pkcs11" engine &#8212;
      for troubleshooting purposes, or because the HSM is unavailable
      &#8212; set the engine to the empty string. For example:
    </p>
<pre class="screen">
$ <strong class="userinput"><code>dnssec-signzone -E '' -S example.net</code></strong>
</pre>
<p>
      This causes
      <span class="command"><strong>dnssec-signzone</strong></span> to run as if it were compiled
      without the --with-pkcs11 option.
    </p>
<p>
      When built with native PKCS#11 mode, the "engine" option has a
      different meaning: it specifies the path to the PKCS#11 provider
      library.  This may be useful when testing a new provider library.
    </p>
</div>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.12.12"></a>Running named with automatic zone re-signing</h3></div></div></div>
<p>
      If you want <span class="command"><strong>named</strong></span> to dynamically re-sign zones
      using HSM keys, and/or to to sign new records inserted via nsupdate,
      then named must have access to the HSM PIN. In OpenSSL-based PKCS#11,
      this is accomplished by placing the PIN into the openssl.cnf file
      (in the above examples,
      <code class="filename">/opt/pkcs11/usr/ssl/openssl.cnf</code>).
    </p>
<p>
      The location of the openssl.cnf file can be overridden by
      setting the OPENSSL_CONF environment variable before running
      named.
    </p>
<p>Sample openssl.cnf:</p>
<pre class="programlisting">
	openssl_conf = openssl_def
	[ openssl_def ]
	engines = engine_section
	[ engine_section ]
	pkcs11 = pkcs11_section
	[ pkcs11_section ]
	PIN = <em class="replaceable"><code>&lt;PLACE PIN HERE&gt;</code></em>
</pre>
<p>
      This will also allow the dnssec-* tools to access the HSM
      without PIN entry. (The pkcs11-* tools access the HSM directly,
      not via OpenSSL, so a PIN will still be required to use
      them.)
    </p>
<p>
      In native PKCS#11 mode, the PIN can be provided in a file specified
      as an attribute of the key's label.  For example, if a key had the label
      <strong class="userinput"><code>pkcs11:object=local-zsk;pin-source=/etc/hsmpin</code></strong>,
      then the PIN would be read from the file
      <code class="filename">/etc/hsmpin</code>.
    </p>
<div class="warning" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;">
<h3 class="title">Warning</h3>
<p>
	Placing the HSM's PIN in a text file in this manner may reduce the
	security advantage of using an HSM. Be sure this is what you want to
	do before configuring the system in this way.
      </p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both">
<a name="dlz-info"></a>DLZ (Dynamically Loadable Zones)</h2></div></div></div>
<p>
    DLZ (Dynamically Loadable Zones) is an extension to BIND 9 that allows
    zone data to be retrieved directly from an external database.  There is
    no required format or schema.  DLZ drivers exist for several different
    database backends including PostgreSQL, MySQL, and LDAP and can be
    written for any other.
  </p>
<p>
    Historically, DLZ drivers had to be statically linked with the named
    binary and were turned on via a configure option at compile time (for
    example, <strong class="userinput"><code>"configure --with-dlz-ldap"</code></strong>).
    Currently, the drivers provided in the BIND 9 tarball in
    <code class="filename">contrib/dlz/drivers</code> are still linked this
    way.
  </p>
<p>
    In BIND 9.8 and higher, it is possible to link some DLZ modules
    dynamically at runtime, via the DLZ "dlopen" driver, which acts as a
    generic wrapper around a shared object implementing the DLZ API.  The
    "dlopen" driver is linked into named by default, so configure options
    are no longer necessary when using these dynamically linkable drivers,
    but are still needed for the older drivers in
    <code class="filename">contrib/dlz/drivers</code>.
  </p>
<p>
    When the DLZ module provides data to named, it does so in text format.
    The response is converted to DNS wire format by named.  This
    conversion, and the lack of any internal caching, places significant
    limits on the query performance of DLZ modules.  Consequently, DLZ is
    not recommended for use on high-volume servers.  However, it can be
    used in a hidden master configuration, with slaves retrieving zone
    updates via AXFR.  (Note, however, that DLZ has no built-in support for
    DNS notify; slaves are not automatically informed of changes to the
    zones in the database.)
  </p>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.13.6"></a>Configuring DLZ</h3></div></div></div>
<p>
      A DLZ database is configured with a <span class="command"><strong>dlz</strong></span>
      statement in <code class="filename">named.conf</code>:
    </p>
<pre class="screen">
    dlz example {
	database "dlopen driver.so <code class="option">args</code>";
	search yes;
    };
    </pre>
<p>
      This specifies a DLZ module to search when answering queries; the
      module is implemented in <code class="filename">driver.so</code> and is
      loaded at runtime by the dlopen DLZ driver.  Multiple
      <span class="command"><strong>dlz</strong></span> statements can be specified; when
      answering a query, all DLZ modules with <code class="option">search</code>
      set to <code class="literal">yes</code> will be queried to find out if
      they contain an answer for the query name; the best available
      answer will be returned to the client.
    </p>
<p>
      The <code class="option">search</code> option in the above example can be
      omitted, because <code class="literal">yes</code> is the default value.
    </p>
<p>
      If <code class="option">search</code> is set to <code class="literal">no</code>, then
      this DLZ module is <span class="emphasis"><em>not</em></span> searched for the best
      match when a query is received.  Instead, zones in this DLZ must be
      separately specified in a zone statement.  This allows you to
      configure a zone normally using standard zone option semantics,
      but specify a different database back-end for storage of the
      zone's data.  For example, to implement NXDOMAIN redirection using
      a DLZ module for back-end storage of redirection rules:
    </p>
<pre class="screen">
    dlz other {
	database "dlopen driver.so <code class="option">args</code>";
	search no;
    };

    zone "." {
	type redirect;
	dlz other;
    };
    </pre>
</div>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.13.7"></a>Sample DLZ Driver</h3></div></div></div>
<p>
      For guidance in implementation of DLZ modules, the directory
      <code class="filename">contrib/dlz/example</code> contains a basic
      dynamically-linkable DLZ module--i.e., one which can be
      loaded at runtime by the "dlopen" DLZ driver.
      The example sets up a single zone, whose name is passed
      to the module as an argument in the <span class="command"><strong>dlz</strong></span>
      statement:
    </p>
<pre class="screen">
    dlz other {
	database "dlopen driver.so example.nil";
    };
    </pre>
<p>
      In the above example, the module is configured to create a zone
      "example.nil", which can answer queries and AXFR requests, and
      accept DDNS updates.  At runtime, prior to any updates, the zone
      contains an SOA, NS, and a single A record at the apex:
    </p>
<pre class="screen">
 example.nil.  3600    IN      SOA     example.nil. hostmaster.example.nil. (
					       123 900 600 86400 3600
				       )
 example.nil.  3600    IN      NS      example.nil.
 example.nil.  1800    IN      A       10.53.0.1
    </pre>
<p>
      The sample driver is capable of retrieving information about the
      querying client, and altering its response on the basis of this
      information.  To demonstrate this feature, the example driver
      responds to queries for "source-addr.<code class="option">zonename</code>&gt;/TXT"
      with the source address of the query.  Note, however, that this
      record will *not* be included in AXFR or ANY responses.  Normally,
      this feature would be used to alter responses in some other fashion,
      e.g., by providing different address records for a particular name
      depending on the network from which the query arrived.
    </p>
<p>
      Documentation of the DLZ module API can be found in
      <code class="filename">contrib/dlz/example/README</code>.  This directory also
      contains the header file <code class="filename">dlz_minimal.h</code>, which
      defines the API and should be included by any dynamically-linkable
      DLZ module.
    </p>
</div>
</div>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both">
<a name="ipv6"></a>IPv6 Support in <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 9</h2></div></div></div>
<p>
        <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 9 fully supports all currently
        defined forms of IPv6 name to address and address to name
        lookups.  It will also use IPv6 addresses to make queries when
        running on an IPv6 capable system.
      </p>
<p>
        For forward lookups, <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 9 supports
        only AAAA records.  RFC 3363 deprecated the use of A6 records,
        and client-side support for A6 records was accordingly removed
        from <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 9.
        However, authoritative <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 9 name servers still
        load zone files containing A6 records correctly, answer queries
        for A6 records, and accept zone transfer for a zone containing A6
        records.
      </p>
<p>
        For IPv6 reverse lookups, <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 9 supports
        the traditional "nibble" format used in the
        <span class="emphasis"><em>ip6.arpa</em></span> domain, as well as the older, deprecated
        <span class="emphasis"><em>ip6.int</em></span> domain.
        Older versions of <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 9
        supported the "binary label" (also known as "bitstring") format,
        but support of binary labels has been completely removed per
        RFC 3363.
        Many applications in <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 9 do not understand
        the binary label format at all any more, and will return an
        error if given.
        In particular, an authoritative <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 9
        name server will not load a zone file containing binary labels.
      </p>
<p>
        For an overview of the format and structure of IPv6 addresses,
        see <a class="xref" href="Bv9ARM.ch11.html#ipv6addresses" title="IPv6 addresses (AAAA)">the section called &#8220;IPv6 addresses (AAAA)&#8221;</a>.
      </p>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.14.6"></a>Address Lookups Using AAAA Records</h3></div></div></div>
<p>
          The IPv6 AAAA record is a parallel to the IPv4 A record,
          and, unlike the deprecated A6 record, specifies the entire
          IPv6 address in a single record.  For example,
        </p>
<pre class="programlisting">
$ORIGIN example.com.
host            3600    IN      AAAA    2001:db8::1
</pre>
<p>
          Use of IPv4-in-IPv6 mapped addresses is not recommended.
          If a host has an IPv4 address, use an A record, not
          a AAAA, with <code class="literal">::ffff:192.168.42.1</code> as
          the address.
        </p>
</div>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="id-1.5.14.7"></a>Address to Name Lookups Using Nibble Format</h3></div></div></div>
<p>
          When looking up an address in nibble format, the address
          components are simply reversed, just as in IPv4, and
          <code class="literal">ip6.arpa.</code> is appended to the
          resulting name.
          For example, the following would provide reverse name lookup for
          a host with address
          <code class="literal">2001:db8::1</code>.
        </p>
<pre class="programlisting">
$ORIGIN 0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.8.b.d.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa.
1.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0  14400   IN    PTR    (
                                    host.example.com. )
</pre>
</div>
</div>
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